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Graffiti, Street Art, Walls, and the Public in Canadian Copyright Law
Pascale Chapdelaine*
8.1 Introduction: A Case Study of Canada’s Copyright Law Balancing Act
Like other parts of the world, graffiti in Canada is vilified, and at the same time is increas-
ingly revered and celebrated. This ambivalence is reflected in the general legal landscape that 
surrounds graffiti and other forms of street art at the criminal, civil, and municipal law levels. 
Within this general legal framework, the application of copyright law to graffiti and street art 
reveals a complex web of interwoven issues about protection of the graffiti artist’s economic and 
moral rights, questions of illegality and public policy, the rights of the property owner of the 
“wall” on which the art resides, and the public.
Through legislative and jurisprudential developments of the last decades, Canadian copyright 
law has moved away from the more traditional copyright- holder- centric regime.1 In Théberge v 
Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc.2 and in subsequent judgements,3 the Supreme Court of 
Canada has repeatedly emphasized that the Copyright Act4 reflects a “balance between promoting 
the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and 
obtaining a just reward for the creator.”5 While the concept of balance was not new to Canadian 
copyright law and policy,6 its articulation in the reasons for judgment in Théberge has influenced 
 * I thank David Vaver, Myra Tawfik, and Enrico Bonadio for their very helpful comments and insights on earlier 
versions of this chapter. I  also thank Peter Yu and the participants of Texas A&M Intellectual Property Scholars 
Roundtable (October 2017), of the Work in Progress in Intellectual Property Colloquium (February 2018), and of the 
ATRIP Conference (August 2018) for their useful comments. I thank Monica Carinci (Windsor Law JD 2018) and 
Shahnaz Dhanani (Windsor Law JD 2019) for their very helpful research assistance.
 1 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada 2012 SCC 36 at para 9 (unanimous 
judgement, Abella J.) [Bell Canada].
 2 2002 SCC 34 [Théberge]
 3 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, 
para 40; Euro- Excellence Inc. v Kraft Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 37, para 76; Bell Canada, (n 1) para 9; Entertainment 
Software Association v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 3, para 7[ESA]; 
Rogers Communications Inc. v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 35, para 40; 
Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010– 167 and Broadcasting Order CRTC 2010– 168, 2012 SCC 68, 
para 64 [CRTC]; Cinar Corporation v Robinson, 2013 SCC 73 at para 23; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v SODRAC 
2003 Inc., 2015 SCC 57 at paras 47,66,74,145, 170,179,180 (both the majority and dissenting opinions) [SODRAC].
 4 R.S.C., 1985, c. C- 42.
 5 Théberge, para 30.
 6 See e.g., Canada, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Copyright in Canada – Proposals for a Revision of 
the Law by A.A. Kayes & C. Brunet, Ottawa: Government of Canada, 144, 235 (1977); From Gutenberg to Telidon: A 
White Paper on Copyright: Proposals for the Revision of the Canadian Copyright Act, Ottawa: Supply and Services 
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the trajectory of later jurisprudential developments. The need to balance the public interest and 
obtain a just reward for the creator guided the court in articulating Canada’s test for the require-
ment of originality, and to recognize “users’ rights.” 7 The balancing act discourse has been center 
stage in the legislative reform process, 8 leading to major amendments of the Copyright Act in 
2012, 9 among which is the addition of new exceptions to copyright infringement. 10 
 Whether the “balancing act” discourse in Canadian copyright law is more than rhetorical 
and may truly steer copyright law away from its copyright- holder centrism has caused many to 
wonder. 11 In light of this “balance seeking” movement of Canadian courts and legislature, the 
application of copyright law to graffi ti and street art is a fi eld of study of choice. To what extent 
should copyright law protect graffi ti and street artists, who by the essence of their work volun-
tarily (sometimes illegally) make their work accessible to the public in open spaces? How does 
the law mediate between the rights of graffi ti and street artists, the rights of the property owner on 
which the art resides, and members of the public? Cutting across the very physical world of con-
crete, bricks and mortar, public spaces, as well as intangible property rights, and virtual worlds 
where public art is shared by members of the public, the application of copyright law to graffi ti 
and street art provides a unique opportunity to push our understanding as to where the balance 
so dear to Canada’s copyright ethos should lie. 
 In this chapter, I argue that while the scope of copyright protection of graffi ti and street art 
may be, on the whole, fairly easily ascertainable and may offer a desirable level of protection to 
their authors, the rights of the public with respect to graffi ti and street art remain fragmented, 
somewhat unclear and likely too limited. This fi nding gives a sobering account of the extent 
to which Canadian copyright law succeeds in adequately addressing competing interests, in a 
context where voluntarily making the work accessible in public spaces, is what defi nes this art 
form to a large extent. 
 I refer to “graffi ti” for writings depicted in public spaces and to “street art” as a more general 
term encompassing graffi ti and any other form of visual art (drawing, painting, sculpture, struc-
ture, object) located in public spaces. I refer to neither graffi ti or street art with a connotation 
of legality or illegality and I will specifi cally refer to their (il)legality as the context may dictate 
from time to time. Given the purpose of this chapter, I have intentionally and as much as pos-
sible limited my analysis to the Canadian context, in an effort to avoid redundancy with other 
chapters in this book discussing other jurisdictions. 
 In  Section 8.2 , I present the tensions that reside within the general Canadian artistic and 
legal landscape of graffi ti and street art. In  Section 8.3 , I look at how copyright law may apply 
to graffi ti and street art, starting with the eligibility requirements for graffi ti and street art to be 
protected, the scope of the exclusive rights that copyright and moral rights may confer on graffi ti 
Culture, The ties that bind, Ottawa: The Committee, 66 (1992); Canada, Intellectual Property Policy Directorate 
Industry Canada, Copyright Policy Branch, Canadian Heritage, Consultation Paper on Digital Copyright Issues, 
6– 7, 22– 24 (June 21, 2001). 
  7  CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada 2004 SCC 13 at paras 10, 14– 36 (in particular 23– 24), 48 [CCH]. 
  8  See Government of Canada offi cial website archives on Bill C- 32, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 3rd Session, 
40th Parl., 2010, Copyright Modernization Act Backgrounder, (2010); see also Government of Canada offi cial web-
site on the adoption of Bill C- 11, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess, 41th Parl, 2011 (assented to June 29, 
2012): Copyright Modernization Act Backgrounder. 
  9  Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20. 
 10  Ibid . 
  11  See e.g.  Theresa  Scassa , “ Users’ Rights in the Balance: Recent Developments in Copyright Law at the Supreme 
Court of Canada ” ( 2005 )  22  CIPJ  133 , 135; for a discussion on the diffi culties around the application of the concept of 
balance in copyright law, see also:  Abraham  Drassinower , “ From Distribution to Dialogue: Remarks on the Concept 
of Balance in Copyright Law ” ( 2009 )  34  The Journal of Corporation Law  991 . 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108563581.009
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and street artists, and the effect of illegality on copyright and moral rights. In Section 8.4, I look 
at the rights and privileges of property owners and of the public to graffiti and street art, as owners 
of the tangible embodiment of the artistic work, through exceptions to copyright infringement 
or user rights, and through the doctrines of implied license and abandonment of rights. I con-
clude briefly in Section 8.5 by reflecting on the many more questions and areas of research not 
addressed in this chapter.
8.2 General Canadian Artistic and Legal Landscape:    
Tensions and Contradictions
In Canada, the regulation of graffiti and street art reflects a duality and to some extent con-
flict towards this form of expression in public spaces. This is particularly the case of major 
Canadian cities’ relation to graffiti and street art. On the one hand, there is a growing gen-
trification trend of graffiti and street art in cities such as Montréal, Toronto, and Vancouver 
that is similar to other cities worldwide. Graffiti and street art have increasingly become an 
urban phenomenon of curiosity and interest, and a source of local pride for their distinct visual 
landscapes and narratives. Montréal, Toronto, and Vancouver boast about their local graffiti 
and street artists, even promoting guided walking tours.12 Each of these three cities has hosted 
mural festivals, some of which have become an annual gathering.13 Canadian Indigenous artists 
(First Nations, Métis, and Inuit peoples) resort to street art often to convey a specific polit-
ical message, reappropriating public spaces, and bypassing traditional art and exhibit networks 
inherited from a colonial past.14 Street art is going indoors with art galleries and museums 
showcasing the talent of local graffiti and street artists.15 CBC National TV popular show Rick 
Mercer Report has given visibility to Graffiti Alley in downtown Toronto, where the host did his 
weekly political rant.16
Municipal regulations and city programs reflect a willingness to invest in street artists and 
promote their art. In Toronto, StART (Street Art Toronto) invites street artist collectives annu-
ally to submit proposals that go through a competitive selection process and allocation of public 
funds.17 This and other graffiti commissioning programs promote graffiti and street art as cre-
ating opportunities for community building and the revitalization of parts of the city.18
 12 Toronto, the official website of Tourism Toronto, Toronto’s street art, www.seetorontonow.com/ my- toronto/ torontos- 
street- art/ #/ sm.00001npzeebeded210teh5b61572x accessed August 25, 2018.
 13 In 2017, Mural Routes hosted its nineteenth symposium on street art in Toronto: https:// muralroutes.ca/ symposium- 
2017/ accessed August 25, 2018.
 14 See Laurence Desmarais & Camille Larivee, “Take Back the Streets” (Canadian Art, October 30, 2017)  https:// 
canadianart.ca/ features/ take- back- the- streets/ ; Mark Ambrose Harris, “ ‘Listen to the Walls’:  These Indigenous 
Street Artists Are Converging to Decolonize Montreal” (CBC News, August 14, 2017) www.cbc.ca/ arts/ listen- to- the- 
walls- these- indigenous- street- artists- are- converging- to- decolonialize- montreal- 1.4246376; Luke Ottenhof, “Artist Jay 
Soule Uses Toronto as a Canvas for his Indigenous Art and Activism,” The Globe and Mail (May 21, 2018) www 
.theglobeandmail.com/ canada/ toronto/ article- artist- jay- soule- uses- toronto- as- a- canvas- for- his- indigenous- art- and/ ; 
Jody Freeman, “Indigenous Street Artists Create Holy Alliances,” Montreal Serai (October 17, 2017)  https:// 
montrealserai.com/ article/ indigenous- street- artists- create- holy- alliances/ accessed 30 Sept 30 2018.
 15 See, e.g., an exhibit organized in a Vancouver art gallery in 2014, Hot Art Wet City Gallery on Main Street http:// 
hotartwetcity.com/ street- art- show/ accessed August 25, 2018.
 16 Host of the humorous weekly show the Rick Mercer Report (which ran for fifteen seasons, until 2018) www.cbc.ca/ 
mercerreport/ accessed August 25, 2018; Tourism Toronto (n 12).
 17 Street Art Toronto – City sponsored program of public murals (StART), https:// www.toronto.ca/ services- payments/ 
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On the other hand, graffiti is still largely prohibited. In Canada, the making of graffiti or street 
art without the consent of the property owner where it is situated may constitute mischief19 and 
in some cases the public incitement or wilful promotion of hatred, all of which are indictable 
offenses liable for imprisonment under the Criminal Code.20 Graffiti art may give rise to offenses 
related to public road safety, as was the case with renowned Montréal artist “Roadsworth” (Peter 
Gibson) who in 2004 was charged (and later conditionally discharged) with fifty- three counts 
of public mischief for his stencils developed from street signage (e.g. a pedestrian crossing 
becoming a giant row of candles).21 In some cases, the making of graffiti or street art will involve 
the tort of trespass, which may also constitute a criminal offense.22 The making of graffiti or street 
art may also constitute a statutory offense liable to a fine under municipal by- laws.23
Municipality by- laws prohibit graffiti, not only from public spaces, but from any space that 
is visually accessible to the public. The interdictions against graffiti extend to private dwelling 
property owners, who have an obligation to keep their premises free of graffiti and to remove it 
once notified by the municipality (most often at their own cost).24 Failure to comply with muni-
cipality orders may lead to clean- up costs or fines.
The underlying premise of city graffiti management plans is that with some exceptions, graf-
fiti is a plague that should be contained and that this endeavor is a collaborative effort between 
the city, the public, and private property owners.25 Citizens are encouraged to report graffiti to 
city officials.26 Advice is given to private property owners on how to keep their property free of 
graffiti and, in some cases, municipalities offer supplies to facilitate this.27
In some cities, property owners may ask that the graffiti or art mural (as opposed to graffiti 
vandalism) be exempt from any city order of removal.28 Local associations or individual property 
owners may also request that graffiti or art murals of a designated area be “regularized.” Such 
permission, if granted, is subject to the graffiti or street art being maintained in good repair.29
Within the dictates of criminal and civil law, Canadian cities’ regulations of graffiti and street 
art prohibit graffiti, treating it as a problem to eradicate, while at the same time encouraging local 
groups to revitalize neighborhoods through graffiti and mural art, and through competitions 
commissioning their creation. While the line between the distasteful and the wonderful, 
 19 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C- 46, s 430: referring to different forms of mischief in relation to property, including 
mischief in relation to specific forms of property e.g. religious property, educational institutions, public community 
buildings, war memorials, and cultural property.
 20 Ibid., ss 319, 430. See e.g.: R v Lelas, [1990] O.J. No. 1587, 58 C.C.C. (3d) 568 (WL) (Ont C.A.); R v Speed, 2003 
SKPC 164 (CanLII); R v Akin, 2011 ABPC 201(CanLII).
 21 Karen Crawley, “Seeing Double: Ironic Encounters between Art and Law” (Doctorate in Civil Laws Thesis, McGill 
University Faculty of Law 2012) 243.
 22 I.e., trespassing at night: Criminal Code (n 19), s 177.
 23 See, e.g., Toronto Municipal Code, § 485– 8.
 24 Ibid. Ch. 485, §485- 3, §485– 7, §485– 8; Ville de Montréal, RCA11 17196, Règlement interdisant les graffiti et exigeant 
que toute propriété soit gardée exempte de graffiti, arts 3, 4, 6, 10, 13– 14, 19 (applicable to the Côte des Neiges and 
Notre-Dame-de-Grâce arrondissements); City of Vancouver, By- law no.  7343, By- law to prevent unsightliness of 
property by prohibiting the placement of graffiti and requiring that property be kept free of graffiti, ss 3- 7, 11; Graffiti 
Management (By- law No. 2008- 01), a by- law of the City of Ottawa to prohibit the placement of graffiti on property 
and to require property be kept free of graffiti.
 25 See e.g. City of Toronto, By- law enforcement, Graffiti, www1.toronto.ca/ wps/ portal/ contentonly?vgnextoid=097a
e9b6ef721410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD&vgnextchannel=2f5b19f155cb0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCR 
accessed August 25, 2018; Ville de Montréal, Graffitis – Enlèvement des graffitis, http:// ville.montreal.qc.ca/ portal/ 
page?_ pageid=9257,130605572&_ dad=portal&_ schema=PORTAL accessed August 25, 2018.
 26 See e.g. City of Toronto, By- law enforcement (n 25).
 27 Ville de Montréal, Trucs et astuces, graffitis et affiches, http:// ville.montreal.qc.ca/ pls/ portal/ docs/ page/ arrond_ cdn_ 
fr/ media/ documents/ depliant_ graffiti.pdf accessed August 25, 2018.
 28 See e.g. Toronto Municipal Code (n 23) §485– 4 E.
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let alone any criteria of artistic merit, may not be enunciated, some parameters are discernible 
as to what graffiti is allowed or not: whether the marking was made with the property owner’s 
consent, whether the marking is a tag,30 whether it may incite hatred or violence, or contains 
profane, vulgar, or offensive language.31 And while what is deemed unacceptable graffiti at the 
municipal level may provide some insights into how copyright law protects, or should protect, 
graffiti and street art, municipal graffiti by- laws seem oblivious to the fact that this visual form of 
expression may be protected by copyright law, which is what we explore next.
8.3 Copyright Law
8.3.1 Requirements for Graffiti or Street Art to be Protected by Copyright
Graffiti and street art, as visual forms of expression, will be protected as a work under the Copyright 
Act (in most instances as “artistic work,” in some cases as “literary work”)32 to the extent that they 
are original and meet the requirement of fixation.33 In CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of 
Upper Canada,34 the Supreme Court laid out the relatively low threshold of originality required 
for copyright to protect the expression of an idea as “an exercise of skill and judgment.”35 As such, 
the work should not be the copy of another work, while the work need not be creative (i.e., novel 
or unique).36 Yet skill and judgment in producing the work necessarily involve intellectual effort, 
effort that is not so trivial as to amount to a purely mechanical exercise.37 The court gave the 
example of changing the font of a work to produce “another” work as being too trivial an exercise 
to warrant protection of a new work.38 In subsequent judgments applying the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s test for skill and judgment, courts have held among others that website metatags are not 
original works,39 while photographs of cars on an online listing website for new and used cars are.40
For the most part, graffiti and street art will likely easily meet the requirement of originality. 
One need only take a look at how street artists use spray paint or work with gravity or the elements 
to realize the level of craftsmanship and creativity that goes into such works. This would place 
them above and beyond mere “skill and judgment.” Much graffiti and street art displays artistic 
creativity in varying degrees which will meet the requirement of originality set out in CCH.41
Graffiti consisting exclusively of words or phrases may not meet the requirement of originality. 
Copyright law generally does not protect words or phrases as literary works.42 However, words or 
phrases depicted in a stylized manner, such as “tags” or “throw- ups,” could be protected as an 
artistic work, provided that they display the level of skill and judgment set out in CCH. Here, it 
is the stylized manner by which the artist produces the letters that may meet the requirement of 
 30 Toronto Municipal Code (n 23) §485- 1 defines a tag as “a stylized signature or logo that is intended to identify an 
individual or group or any other marking used for a like purpose or effect.”
 31 Toronto By- law 485- 1, Definitions “Graffiti vandalism.”
 32 Copyright Act, s 2, which defines artistic work as including paintings, drawings, sculptures, works of artistic crafts-
manship, architectural works, and compilations of artistic works.
 33 Ibid. s 5.
 34 CCH (n 7).




 39 Red Label Vacations Inc. v 411 Travel Buys Ltd, 2015 FCA 290 (Fed.CA).
 40 Trader Corp v CarGurus, Inc., 2017 ONSC 1841.
 41 CCH (n 7) paras 16, 25.
 42 Exxon Corp v Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd. [1981] 1 WLR 624 (Ch D); aff’d on appeal: Exxon 
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originality, not the words themselves, which would remain free to be used by the public. The simi-
larity between the graphic styles used by graffiti artists to depict letters or words should not per se be 
a bar to copyright protection. As stated in CCH, originality does not require novelty.43 Therefore, 
two similar graffiti produced with skill and judgment could equally meet the threshold of origin-
ality provided that each work originated from its author and was not copied from the other.44
Although the Copyright Act does not explicitly require fixation for a work to be protected, with two 
exceptions,45 the prevailing view is that a work must be fixed in some material form to be protected 
by copyright. In Théberge v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc.46 the Supreme Court endorsed the 
requirement of fixation in Canadian copyright law, stating that fixation is what distinguishes works 
capable of copyright protection from general ideas that are in the public domain.47 The requirement 
of fixation signifies that not all expressions of intellectual effort may be protected: only those that 
find some permanence through material form are. A predilection among street artists for the use of 
permanent paint, either with brushes or spray cans, or markers, will easily fulfill the requirement of 
fixation. Chalk drawings on a sidewalk could fulfill this requirement of permanence, which may 
be supplemented by fixation in another material form, such as a photograph of the chalk drawing.
8.3.2 Scope of Copyright and Moral Rights Conferred to Graffiti or Street Artists
Graffiti or street art that fulfills the requirement of originality and fixation, that is made by a 
treaty country member person under the conditions prescribed by the Copyright Act,48 will 
be protected as an artistic work and will confer on its author copyright and moral rights.49 
“Copyright” means the exclusive economic rights of the author to “produce or reproduce the 
work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever” and “to perform the work or 
any substantial part thereof in public.”50 The Copyright Act further enumerates a non- exhaustive 
list of acts involving productions and reproductions in other material forms, communications to 
the public, and specific types of derivative work that are reserved to the copyright holder. The 
wording of the Act is conducive to a technologically neutral interpretation.51 Authors shall enjoy 
copyright for a period of fifty years after their death52 and for a shorter period of time for anonymous 
works.53 The same term applies to moral rights.54
 43 CCH (n 7) paras 16, 25.
 44 Ibid. para 16.
 45 Copyright Act, s 2; “computer programs”, some “dramatic works”, and “sound recordings” require fixation to be protected.
 46 2002 SCC 34.
 47 Ibid. para 25. See also Gould Estate v Stoddart Publishing Co. (1996) 30 O.R. (3d) 520 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) aff’d 
Glen Gould Estate v Stoddart Publishing Co. (1998), 39 OR (3d) 555; 80 CPR (3d) 161 (CA); where the court held 
that an interview did not meet the requirement of expression in a material form and as such was not recognized as 
literary work.
 48 Copyright Act, s 2; treaty country means a Berne Convention country, Universal Copyright Convention country, 
WIPO Copyright Treaty country or World Trade Organization member, s 5.
 49 Copyright Act, ss 3, 5, 14.1.
 50 Copyright Act, s 3, which also includes the exclusive right to publish unpublished works.
 51 See Pascale Chapdelaine, Copyright User Rights, Contracts and the Erosion of Property (Oxford University Press 
2017), 184– 87.
 52 The term of copyright will be extended to the life of the author plus seventy years if Canada ratifies the United 
States– Mexico– Canada Agreement, s. 20.63, https:// international.gc.ca/ trade- commerce/ trade- agreements- accords- 
commerciaux/ agr- acc/ cusma- aceum/ index.aspx?lang=eng accessed May 8, 2019, the negotiations of which were 
completed on September 30, 2018. See Government of Canada, A New United States Mexico Canada Agreement 
https:// international.gc.ca/ trade- commerce/ trade- agreements- accords- commerciaux/ agr- acc/ usmca- aeumc/ index.
aspx?lang=eng accessed October 30, 2018.
 53 Copyright Act, ss 6– 6.2.
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To the extent that the graffiti or street art qualifies as “work”, the Copyright Act confers moral 
rights to the graffiti artist, i.e., a right to the integrity of the work and a right to be associated with 
the work (including under a pseudonym and the right to remain anonymous).55 Moral rights are 
personal to the author and may be waived but may not be assigned.56 Unlike copyright, there 
are no statutory exceptions (e.g. fair dealing) that apply to the infringement of moral rights.57 
Canadian jurisprudence on moral rights tends to be more sparse and hence reference often 
needs to be made to the relevant provisions in the Copyright Act.
A graffiti or street artist’s right to integrity will be infringed only if their honor or reputation 
is prejudiced by the street art being distorted, mutilated, or otherwise modified.58 Particularly 
relevant to street artists is the presumption that such prejudice to their honor or reputation has 
occurred if the work that has been distorted, mutilated, or modified is a painting, sculpture, or 
engraving.59 The intention behind this specific protection for certain visual works seems to rec-
ognize the unique, single- copy nature of these types of work of art which are not easily replace-
able.60 The Copyright Act further clarifies that “a change in the location of a work, the physical 
means by which a work is exposed or the physical structure containing a work, or steps taken 
in good faith to restore or preserve the work shall not, by that act alone, constitute a distortion, 
mutilation or other modification of the work.”61 The right to the integrity of the work may also 
be infringed if it has been used in association with a product, service, cause or institution to the 
prejudice of the street artist’s honor or reputation.62
If the graffiti or street art was performed legally (e.g. it does not involve trespass or vandalism) 
and is lawful as to its content and substance, and if the artist has not waived their moral rights 
to the work (either expressly or impliedly), one can think of various situations where the street 
artist may seek to enforce their moral right to the integrity of their work whether with respect to 
(i) the physical aspects of the work or (ii) any association made with their work, or (iii) the right 
of attribution. I will deal with the effect that illegality, either in the substance of the work or in 
how it was produced, may have on the protection of moral rights further in Section 8.3.3.
With respect to the physical aspects surrounding a work, i.e. its location and embodiment, or 
preservation procedures (maintenance) that may come in conflict with the moral right to the 
integrity of the work, the law grants flexibility and discretion to the owner of the physical copy 
of the work (here most often the property owner of the land or premises where the graffiti or 
street art is located) by keeping such physical considerations on their own out of the artist’s right 
of integrity.63 At the same time, the property owner or any other person could be liable to moral 
right infringement if they make changes to the street art or graffiti without the consent of the 
artist falling outside those physical considerations surrounding graffiti or street art. Attaching 
 55 Ibid. s 14.1(1) provides: “The author of a work has … the right to the integrity of the work and, in connection with an 
act mentioned in section 3, the right, where reasonable in the circumstances, to be associated with the work as its 
author by name or under a pseudonym and the right to remain anonymous.”
 56 Ibid. s 14.1(2) provides that moral rights may be waived in whole or in part.
 57 Ibid. ss 29 ff fair dealing and other exceptions provisions state that certain acts do not infringe “copyright” and do 
not refer to “moral rights”; see, however, Wiseau Studio et al. v Richard Harper, 2017 ONSC 6535, para 120 [Wiseau] 
where the Ontario Superior Court held in obiter that moral rights were also subject to the fair dealing exception.
 58 Ibid. s 28.2(1) and (2).
 59 Ibid. s 28.2(2).
 60 Elizabeth Adeney, The Moral Rights of Authors and Performers (Oxford University Press 2006) para 12.64, citing Ms 
Wanda Noel (Expert Consultant, Copyright, Department of Communications), Committee Proceedings, Bill C- 60 
9:50 (December 10, 1987).
 61 Copyright Act, s 28.2(3) (emphasis added).
 62 Ibid. s 28.2(1)(b).
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ribbons to an art structure of sixty geese made by Canadian artist Michael Snow, and displayed 
at the Toronto Eaton Centre shopping mall, was held to infringe the moral rights of integrity 
of the artist in Snow v Eaton Centre Ltd.64 On the basis of this judgment, a change in colour or 
redrawing over the graffiti or street art could infringe the moral right of integrity of the artist.
It is unclear whether the right of integrity would allow a street artist to enforce their moral 
rights against the destruction of their work, a question particularly relevant in the context of 
the impermanence that may be associated with graffiti and some forms of street art, and the 
exigencies of maintenance and transformation of public spaces. Preparatory works leading to 
the current provision in the Copyright Act on the right of integrity viewed “destruction” as anti-
thetical to the right to the integrity of the work.65 In that view, once the work is destroyed, there 
is no longer the possibility of “prejudice to the honour or reputation of the author.”66 However, 
when the artwork is in the public eye, its voluntary destruction, it seems, could in some cases 
prejudice the honor and reputation of the author by publicly signalling that the work is not 
worth keeping.
Artists might successfully enforce their moral rights against the destruction of their graffiti 
or street art by assimilating destruction into “mutilation.”67 This is what the Cour Supérieure 
du Québec did in Vaillancourt c Carbone 14,68 awarding $150,000 in damages to plaintiff 
Armand Vaillancourt, an artist of international renown, against the property owner and its agent 
for the near- complete destruction69 of a sculpture consisting of ten totem poles that was on 
the defendant’s property under a contract of deposit.70 The court assimilated near- complete 
destruction into “mutilation,” against which an author may enforce their moral rights,71 without 
discussing whether destruction was effectively part of the moral right of attribution.72 The court 
did not have to discuss the prejudice to the author’s honor and reputation, such prejudice being 
presumed for a sculpture.73
It seems that mutilation of a work implies that at least some portion of the work remains 
whereas destruction does not.74 The discomfort around extending the right of integrity to pre-
vent the destruction of a work may be explained in part because it would impinge too much 
on the powers and privileges of the property owner of the tangible embodiment of the artwork 
to ultimately dispose of it if they so choose. At the same time, the need to mediate between 
the conflicting interests of the artist and of the property owner of the tangible copy of the work 
may be addressed at the enforcement level where courts have discretion on the remedies to 
be awarded, rather than denying that artists would have any right to prevent the destruction 
 64 1982 CarswellOnt 1336, 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105 (Ont. H.C.J.).
 65 Adeney (n 60), para 12.55, citing Mr Edwards (Member for the Committee): Committee Proceedings, Bill C- 60 9:49 
(December 10, 1987): “to include destruction might in a perverse way offend the principle of preserving a moral 
right.”
 66 As required by the Copyright Act, s 28.2. See also Gnass v Cité d’Alma (June 3, 1977) (Que C.A)_ [unreported: doc 
no. 200- 09- 000032- 745], where the Court rejected sculptors’ claims that their moral rights had been infringed when 
the municipality threw the public sculptures in the river after they had deteriorated through neglect and vandalism; 
discussed in David Vaver, “Authors’ Moral Rights in Canada” (1983) 14 IIC 329 at 341 ff.
 67 Copyright Act, ss 14.1(1), 28.2(1).
 68 1998 CarswellQue 2379, [1999] R.J.Q. 490, J.E. 99– 403.
 69 Ibid. at para 55, referring to 80 percent destruction.
 70 Civil Code of Québec, Art 2280.
 71 Copyright Act, s 28.2(1)(a).
 72 Vaillancourt c Carbone 14 (n 68), para 25.
 73 Copyright Act, s 28.2(2).
 74 Oxford Living Dictionaries, https:// en.oxforddictionaries.com/ definition/ destruction accessed August 25, 2018; 
defining “destruction: The action or process of causing so much damage to something that it no longer exists or 
























Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Cambridge University Press, on 04 Feb 2021 at 17:22:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Graffiti, Street Art, Walls, and Public: Canada 131
131
of their work. Recognizing those competing interests could for instance allow a court using its 
discretionary powers to order, where possible, removal of the work before its destruction. Under 
the current language of the right of attribution under the Copyright Act, it would perhaps not 
go as far as allowing the court to grant injunctive relief to stop the complete destruction of the 
painting or sculpture.
A graffiti or street artist may have a claim against the use of his art in association with a 
product, service, cause, or institution, if such use is made to the prejudice of their honor or 
reputation.75 For instance, a street artist may succeed in enforcing their right of integrity against 
a fashion designer using his graffiti art on his latest collection, or a television producer or adver-
tisement firm reproducing conspicuously their art on their show or an advert.76 Courts seem to 
be willing to defer to the views of the artist in establishing a prejudice to their honor or reputa-
tion, as long as the prejudice can be established with some level of objectivity.77
A declared purpose of street artists is often to reappropriate public spaces through their graffiti 
or murals, in response to commercialism and increased privatization of public spaces.78 In that 
light, the repulsion of a street artist to their art being associated with consumerism and commer-
cialization may be sufficient for a finding of infringement of their moral rights.79 This would be 
in addition to any remedies a street artist may have for copyright infringement (e.g. reproduc-
tion, communication to the public, etc.).
Last but not least, street artist moral rights could be infringed if in performing any of the acts 
reserved to copyright holders (e.g., reproduction or communication to the public by telecom-
munication of their work) a person fails to attribute the work to the artist by name or pseudonym 
(where reasonable to do so) or fails to maintain the artist’s right to remain anonymous.80 The 
right of attribution of the street artist could be infringed, for instance, in the news reporting of 
local street art, or when a publisher reproduces their work in a tourist guide book on street art 
without acknowledging the author of the graffiti or street art, or, on the contrary, disclosing their 
identity where the street artist has chosen to remain anonymous.
Graffiti or street artists may waive their moral rights (in whole or in part) for instance in a 
contract with a property owner commissioning mural art on their wall. Unlike the assignment of 
copyright, the Copyright Act does not explicitly require the waiver to be in writing to be valid.81 
At the same time the Act is unequivocal that an assignment of copyright does not on its own give 
rise to a waiver of moral rights,82 However, when the copyright of a work is assigned or licensed 
by the author to another party and moral rights are waived, the Act extends the benefit of the 
waiver of moral rights to anyone authorized to use the work by the assignee or licensee of the 
 75 Copyright Act, ss 14.1(1) and 28.2(1)(b).
 76 Graeme Hamilton, “Artist Sues after TV Show Films Montreal Building that he had Tagged with Graffiti” (The 
National Post, July 28, 2014)  http:// news.nationalpost.com/ news/ canada/ artist- sues- after- tv- show- films- montreal- 
building- that- he- had- tagged- with- graffiti accessed August 25, 2018, referring to a petition filed by Montréal artist 
Alexandre Veilleux against Radio- Canada Productions Aetios Inc. (producer of the popular television show 30 Vies) 
claiming infringement of his moral right of integrity for featuring the artist’s spray- painted graffiti tags without his 
consent (alleging damage to his artistic reputation by associating his art with the show).
 77 Snow v Eaton Centre Ltd. (n 64), paras 5,6,8; Prise De Parole Inc. v Guérin, Éditeur Ltée, [1995] F.C.J. No. 1583 (FC), 
paras 24– 26.
 78 See e.g.: Jeff Ferrell, “Urban Graffiti: Crime, Control, and Resistance” (1995) 27(1) Youth and Society 73, 79; Andrea 
Mubi Brighenti, “At the Wall: Graffiti Writers, Urban Territoriality, and the Public Domain” (2010) 13(3) Space and 
Culture 315, 318.
 79 See David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law, Copyright Patents, Trade- Marks (2nd edn, Irwin Law 2011) 211.
 80 Copyright Act, s 14.1(1).
 81 Ibid. ss 13(4), 14.1(2), (3), (4).
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copyright.83 Courts have held that a waiver of moral rights may be implied.84 For instance, could 
we construe that graffiti that was created on a wall without the property owner’s permission 
carries with it an implied waiver of the author’s moral rights (assuming that copyright would 
subsist in such work)?
All the situations discussed so far have been analyzed on the premise that the graffiti or street 
art is lawful. May a street artist invoke moral rights when their work is unlawful in how it was 
produced or in its substance? I discuss this question next together with the right to enforce copy-
right for works that are connected to some form of illegality.
8.3.3 Illegality, Copyright, and Moral Rights Protection
The question arises as to whether copyright protects or should protect graffiti or street art that 
involves some form of illegality, for example mischief or vandalism, wilful promotion of hatred, 
or the tort of trespass. The effect of illegality on the copyright protection of graffiti or any other 
work is not entirely clear. Unlike other jurisdictions, Canada’s Copyright Act is silent on that 
question.85 The general legal framework that regulates graffiti and the few cases that have dealt 
with illegality and copyright suggest that the question may be best addressed by first looking at 
the effects of illegality on the eligibility for copyright protection and second, on its enforcement. 
It may also be helpful to consider whether the illegality pertains to the subject matter of the work 
itself, e.g. graffiti that wilfully promotes hatred, or whether the illegality pertains to how the work 
was produced, e.g. an act of vandalism or through trespass, without the work containing illegal 
material per se. The difference between the intangible intellectual property right of the author 
in the graffiti or street art, and the tangible embodiment in which their copyright may materi-
alize should also be borne in mind.
In one older case, Aldrich v One Stop Video Ltd,86 the British Columbia Superior Court 
held that copyright subsisted in the plaintiff’s films as dramatic works, which both parties had 
conceded were obscene works under the Criminal Code.87 Pointing to earlier versions of the 
Copyright Act that banned works from copyright protection that were “immoral or licentious, 
treasonable or seditious”, the court noted that such restrictions had been removed since the 
Copyright Act of 1921.88 The court found there was nothing in the Act that precluded obscene 
works from receiving protection.89 The court considered the public policy doctrine in light of 
the “encouragement of creativity, international protection of copyright and the flexibility in 
moral values,”90 and was not convinced that the refusal of copyright protection was the proper 
way to restrain the dissemination of obscenity, and questioned whether banning copyright pro-
tection would serve public policy interests.91 In Pasickniak v Dojacek,92 the Manitoba Court of 
 83 Ibid. s 14.1(4). See Mira T. Sundara Rajan, Moral Rights: Principles, Practice and New Technology (Oxford University 
Press 2011) 129– 30.
 84 See Ta- Ha v Centre hospitalier de l’Université Laval [1999] J.Q. no 181 (C.S. Qué) para 22; see Normand Tamaro, The 
2016 Annotated Copyright Act (Thomson Reuters Canada 2015) 514.
 85 See e.g. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c.48 (UK), s 171(3), allowing the application of public policy to 
copyright at the enforcement stage of copyright.
 86 Aldrich v One Stop Video Ltd, [1987] BCJ No 1035, 39 DLR (4th) 362 (BCSC).
 87 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, C-34, s. 159, as it was then in force: Ibid, para 7.
 88 Aldrich v One Stop Video Ltd, (n 86), paras 28– 31.
 89 Ibid. para 114.
 90 Ibid. para 100.
 91 Ibid.
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Appeal had also come to the conclusion in an obiter dictum that the Act did not preclude the 
protection of obscene works, having otherwise held that books on dream interpretation were not 
obscene.93
While the court in Aldrich was not prepared to refuse copyright protection to the plaintiff’s 
films as dramatic works on the basis that they were obscene, the court limited the plaintiff’s rem-
edies to injunctive relief and delivery up and denied damages and account for profits.94 Because 
the distribution of the plaintiff’s obscene materials by the defendant was a criminal act, the 
plaintiff could claim no compensable loss where the “copyright owner’s anticipated gain would 
flow from an illegal act.”95 At the same time, an injunction (which prevented the infringement 
of the plaintiff’s copyright) as well as delivery up of infringing copies (the possession of obscene 
materials not being illegal) did not offend fundamental principles of law and were consequently 
awarded.96
Granting remedies as the court did in Aldrich, so long as they do not allow the successful party 
to benefit from its own or the other party’s illegality, accords with the doctrine of clean hands,97 
a defense in equity that may be invoked against the grant of an equitable remedy e.g. an injunc-
tion.98 In City of Toronto v Polai,99 a leading case on the doctrine of clean hands, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal emphasized that the defense was available to the extent that the wrongful con-
duct of the plaintiff pertains to “the very matter at which was the subject of the suit in equity” 
and that the doctrine should not be applied too broadly.100
On the one hand, in Canada there seems to be little appetite or ground to refuse copyright 
protection of a work on the basis of illegality, even if the subject matter of the work is illegal as 
such (e.g. obscene). Courts may refuse to grant protection, e.g. for graffiti that promotes hatred 
on the basis of the doctrine of public policy. Even there, it seems that courts will weigh the 
effects of illegality of the work and public policy at the enforcement stage rather than by refusing 
to grant copyright protection. For instance, awarding an injunction to the author of graffiti that 
promotes hatred, against the owner of the physical embodiment of the graffiti, to prevent a repro-
duction that would further publicly incite hatred (hence recognizing copyright in the graffiti) 
would not go against public policy. However, awarding account for profits to the author of such 
work as a result of a third party selling reproductions of the graffiti wilfully promoting hatred 
against a targeted group would.101
For cases where the illegality surrounds the production of the graffiti or street art (e.g. van-
dalism or trespass), refusing to grant protection on the ground of illegality seems even less likely 
than when illegality pertains to the subject matter of the work. In my view, it would also be 
misguided, given that the illegality would pertain to the manner in which the physical copy of 
 93 Ibid. para 61.
 94 Aldrich v One Stop Video Ltd (n 86), paras 117– 24.
 95 Ibid. paras 117– 18.
 96 Ibid. paras 119, 122.
 97 From the maxim he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
 98 City of Toronto v Polai [1970] 1 OR 48 (Ont CA); John S. McKeown, Fox on Canadian Law of Copyright and 
Industrial Designs (Carswell 2013) ch 24, 13(b).
 99 [1970] 1 OR 48 (Ont CA).
 100 Ibid. Cases invoking the doctrine of clean hands against a claim of copyright infringement often involve possible 
exploitation of copyright in contravention of the Competition Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C- 34. See e.g. Volkswagen Canada 
Inc. v Access International Automotive Ltd. (C.A.), 2001 FCA 79.
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the work was produced, which should be dissociated from the intangible intellectual property 
rights conferred in the work. Other laws would deal more aptly with this form of illegality than 
copyright law. 
 On the other hand, the illegality of how the graffi ti or street artwork was produced may limit 
the remedies to which the graffi ti artist would be normally entitled, to the extent that awarding 
such remedies would further the illegality or rely on it, or under the doctrine of clean hands, that 
it would pertain to the very subject matter for which the graffi ti artist seeks redress. 
 If an artist who had produced graffi ti through trespass and an act of vandalism (mischief) 
sought to enforce their copyright against a designer or publisher who had reproduced the graffi ti 
on dresses or in a book, courts may be inclined to grant injunctive relief to stop the infringement 
(and stop the designer or publisher from indirectly profi ting from a criminal act) while refusing 
damages or account for profi t to be granted to the artist, to the extent that it would allow the artist 
to recover a loss which should not be subject to compensation, as it would amount to indirectly 
profi ting from an illegal act of vandalism. The assumption under this scenario would be that the 
illegality was established for it to possibly play a role in the award of remedies (i.e. the graffi ti 
artist was found guilty of a criminal act or held civilly liable). 
 Alternatively, courts could view the sale of dresses or books with the graffi ti art as not an illegal 
act per se and allow the graffi ti artist to recover damages or account for profi t as well, unlike in 
 Aldrich , where the sale of obscene material as such was illegal. 102 
 For the sake of argument (although somewhat implausible) if the same artist (having produced 
graffi ti through trespass and vandalism) seeks an injunction against the property owner where 
trespass and vandalism were committed to enforce their moral rights of integrity of the work 
against the property owner who is about to erase the graffi ti, would it go against public policy and 
the doctrine of clean hands to award injunctive or other relief in such a case? By doing so, would 
the court not be denying the property owner’s right (and even preclude them from performing 
their obligation in some cases) to remove graffi ti and other acts of vandalism from their property? 
 Another diffi culty in this scenario is that it is less than certain that the artist’s moral rights to 
the integrity of her graffi ti include the right to prevent its erasing or destruction. 103 
 The scenario of enforcement of an artist’s moral rights against a property owner where the 
graffi ti or street art was made without the owner’s consent also illustrates the particular balancing 
act involved where there is only one copy of the copyright work that is owned by someone else 
than the artist, here by the property owner where the graffi ti or street art resides. A closer look 
at the rights of the owner of the tangible copy of the copyright work may help further elucidate 
how this balancing act between competing interests could be best addressed. 
 8.4  Rights and Privileges of Property Owners and the 
Public to Graffiti and Street Art 
 In light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence seeking to move away from a more copyright- 
holder- centric approach to copyright, 104 graffi ti and street art are a great case study in how we 
may bring the mediating exercise of competing interests between artists, property owners, other 
users, and the public to the streets and other public spaces. At the heart of this endeavor, we 
need to query the signifi cance of graffi ti and street art as a form of expression made voluntarily 
 102  Aldrich v One Stop Video Ltd ( n 86 ), paras 117– 18. 
 103  See  Section 8.3.2 above. 
 104  See discussion above in  Section 8.1 . 
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accessible in public spaces, while considering the effects that illegality may have on balancing 
competing interests around this form of art. 
 8.4.1  Rights of Owners of the Tangible Embodiment of Graffi ti or Street Art 
 The property owner of the premises where the graffi ti or street art is painted or located enjoys 
distinct powers and privileges on the physical embodiment of the work from the ones of the artist 
and from members of the public who may come across the work. Property law will dictate to a 
large extent the rights of the property owner where the graffi ti or street art is painted or located, 
as supplemented by contract law where the work is commissioned under a contract between 
the property owner and the artist. Unless the copyright in the artistic work has been assigned in 
writing to the property owner, the artist retains copyright in the work. 105 
 There are various scenarios under which the owner of the property on which the graffi ti or street 
art resides would own the physical copy of the graffi ti or street art. In the case of a commissioned 
mural, or standalone structure or sculpture, the property owner having commissioned the art-
istic work would normally be the owner of the physical embodiment or copy of the work. In 
the case of a non- commissioned artistic work on a wall or other structure, the property owner 
could become the owner of the physical copy of the graffi ti or street art through the property law 
doctrines of fi xtures, accession, or alteration, depending on whether the graffi ti or street art is 
attached or affi xed to personal or real property. 106 
 In the case of a non- commissioned standalone work of art or structure (akin to a sculpture) 
left on public or private property, the doctrine of abandonment might apply to the extent there 
would be an intention of the artist to renounce title to the physical object embodying the copy-
right work. 107 The public or private property owner where the work of art was abandoned may 
thereafter become the owner of the physical embodiment of the artistic work. Abandonment of 
the physical object does not entail assignment of the copyright in the artistic work (as this needs 
to be expressly done in writing) 108 and would not necessarily result in an implied license to the 
copyright. 109 
 There may be other instances when the artist and not the property owner of the premises 
where the work of art resides is the owner of the physical embodiment, e.g. where there is a 
specifi c agreement under which the artist leases or leaves in consignment the work of art to the 
property owner where the work of art resides. 
 The right of the property owner to subsequently sell the physical object embodying the graf-
fi ti or street art calls into question the exclusive distribution right of the artist and whether such 
right has been exhausted. 110 Introduced in the Copyright Act in 2012, the distribution right gives 
the artist the exclusive right with respect to “a work that is in the form of a tangible object, to sell 
 or otherwise transfer ownership of the tangible object” only with respect to the fi rst ownership 
transfer of the tangible object, after which the distribution right is exhausted. 111 
 105  Copyright Act, s. 13(4), which provides that such assignment must be in writing to be valid. 
 106  See  Bruce H.  Ziff ,  Principles of Property Law (7th edn,  Carswell  2018 ) at 136– 39, 146– 52. In Québec, see arts 954– 64; 
971– 75 Civil Code of Québec. 
 107  Ziff ( n 106 ), 160– 61. 
 108  Copyright Act, s 13(4). 
 109  See  Section 8.4.2.4 . 
 110  Copyright Act, s 3(1)j. For a discussion of the application of exhaustion of the distribution right to graffi ti on walls 
subsequently cut out from the wall for sale in a UK and EU context, see  Marta  Iljadica ,  Copyright Beyond Law, 
Regulating Creativity in the Graffi ti Subculture ( Hart  2016 ) 258– 62. 
  111  Copyright Act, s.3(1)j (emphasis added). 
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In instances where ownership of the physical object of the artistic work was transferred from 
the artist to the property owner upon delivery of the artistic work, the property owner of that 
object is thereafter free to sell it with no duty to account to the artist as in such case the distribu-
tion right is exhausted (also called the first sale doctrine).112
What if there was no transfer of ownership per se of a tangible object by the artist to the prop-
erty owner? For example, what if the property owner became in physical possession and control 
of the artistic work as displayed on their property – real or personal – through the property law 
doctrine of fixtures, accession or alteration? In such instances, unless it can be held that upon 
completion of the work, the artist would be deemed to have otherwise transferred ownership to 
the tangible object as per the meaning of the Copyright Act, then exhaustion of the artist’s dis-
tribution right would not yet have taken place at that time. While a literal interpretation of the 
exclusive distribution right provision would likely favor the artist by reserving their distribution 
right, an argument based on the general spirit of that provision could be made in favor of the 
property owner.113
In parallel to the copyright regime prescribing when exhaustion of the artist’s distribution 
right applies, the next question is from a property law perspective: what happens upon the phys-
ical transformation of the embodiment of the artistic work, e.g. when the contribution of the 
artist on the wall is cut out from it? Does the relevant property doctrine that may have conferred 
to the property owner of e.g. the wall, physical control and powers over the physical embodi-
ment of the artistic work as found on their wall, still confer the same privileges and powers to 
the property owner after the artistic work is voluntarily removed from their wall for sale?114 For 
instance, the graffiti or other graphic work is taken from the wall either through a substrate 
method or a cut- out of the wall, converting the piece of wall into a chattel, as it has often been 
the case with works by Banksy, including in Toronto.115 Or the artistic work that was attached to 
real or personal property is detached from it.
If the property owner is deemed the owner of the detached embodiment of the artistic work 
after this transformation, this may satisfy the requirements of the Copyright Act that ownership 
in the tangible object in which the artistic work is embedded has been “otherwise transferred” 
to the property owner.116 Thus to the extent that exhaustion of the distribution right may not 
have yet taken place, it would support an argument that it ought to apply from the moment that 
the standalone tangible object is deemed to be owned by the property owner. If on the other 
 112 Ibid.
 113 Under one interpretation of the Copyright Act, s. 3(1)j, favorable to the artist, while the artist may relinquish privileges 
and powers over the copy of their street art painted e.g. on the property owner’s wall, they do so only to the extent that 
the work remains on the wall; if the property owner cuts out a piece of the wall or transposes the artistic work from 
the wall to e.g. a canvas, the transfer of ownership of this standalone tangible object would require the authorization 
of the artist as it is only then that it would trigger the application of the exclusive distribution right to authorize the 
first sale or other transfer of ownership of their work in the form of a tangible object. Under another interpretation of 
the Act, favorable to the property owner, if the author voluntarily relinquishes privileges and powers over the physical 
embodiment of their work (e.g. by painting their work on someone else’s wall), the requirement of Copyright Act, 
s. 3(1)j would have been met and it is thereafter, for all intents and purposes, up to the property owner of the physical 
embodiment (e.g. the wall) to decide what happens to that physical embodiment of the work with no duty to account 
to the artist. The landmark judgment by the Supreme Court, Théberge (n 2), in particular para 31, could lend some 
support to that interpretation.
 114 It is difficult to predict what may apply in such cases under the property law doctrine of fixtures, alteration, or 
accession. The application of these doctrines seem to be incumbent upon the specific facts in each case, and courts 
have discretion in the award of remedies. See Ziff (n 106), 136– 39,146– 52.
 115 Adrian Cheung, “Banksy Artwork Restored as Public Art in Pedestrian Walkway” CBC News (February 13, 2017) www 
.cbc.ca/ news/ canada/ toronto/ banksy- art- path- pedestrian- walkway- 1.3980193 accessed August 25, 2018.
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hand the transformation of the physical embodiment would result in some ownership interest 
or claim in the embodiment of the work being conferred to the artist, then the property owner 
would be precluded from selling the standalone physical object embedding the artistic work, or 
could otherwise be liable to the artist.
The application of various property law doctrines that mediate competing ownership interests 
in the case of mixed labor, materials, chattels, or real property, and exhaustion of the exclusive 
distribution right in the artistic work reveal a complex interaction of competing interests in 
property law juxtaposed over competing interests in copyright law that may not fit squarely. The 
evolution of the property doctrines of fixtures, accession, and alteration leans toward a nuanced 
approach to the treatment of competing ownership interests in one object that favors a con-
textual analysis in lieu of the application of rigid rules.117 Equity, the good faith of the artist and 
of the property owner of the physical embodiment (e.g., whether the work was created without 
the authorization of the property owner, or by committing trespass or mischief) would play a 
role in determining whether the artist could have any claim on the sale of the physical object 
embodying their work once transformed from a confining embodiment of the property owner to 
a standalone sellable object.118
It is unlikely that the sale of a cut- out piece of a wall or fence would constitute a violation of 
moral rights. In Canada, moral rights do not extend to preventing a change in the location of 
the work, the physical means by which the work is exposed, or physical structure containing the 
work.119
The subsequent transfer of ownership of the physical object embodying the artistic work does 
not involve a droit de suite or similar right that in other jurisdictions allows the artist to recoup 
some of the benefits made from the resale of their work subsequent to the first transfer of owner-
ship.120 Authors do not enjoy such rights in Canada.
While the property owner may be able to sell the copy of the graffiti or street art residing on 
their property under some of the scenarios contemplated above, with no duty to account to the 
graffiti or street artist, the property owner would be precluded from selling the copy of the graf-
fiti or street art in their possession where that sale would be illegal (e.g. the sale of an obscene 
work or a sale which would amount to wilful promotion of hatred).121 However, the illegality 
surrounding the production of the graffiti or street art (e.g. trespass or vandalism (mischief)) 
would not in my view preclude the property owner from selling the artwork. Although one may 
argue that permitting the sale would allow the property owner to benefit indirectly from an 
unlawful act, such unlawful act would need to have been established through a criminal con-
viction or successful civil action against the graffiti artist initiated by the property owner who 
afterward seeks to sell the embodiment of the graffiti, structure, or sculpture. This would seem 
very unlikely. And even if the illegality is established, the sale itself would not be illegal, and 
could hardly be said to perpetrate the illegality of trespass or mischief.
The rights of the property owner of the physical embodiment of the graffiti or street art are 
subject to the exclusive copyright of the artist (e.g. to produce or reproduce the work, to com-
municate it by telecommunication) unless they have been assigned in writing,122 and to their 
moral rights unless they have been waived.123 The property owner of the physical embodiment 
 117 Ziff (n 106), at 136– 39,146– 52.
 118 Ibid.
 119 Copyright Act, s 28.2(3)(a).
 120 See e.g. French Code de propriété intellectuelle, art L122- 8.
 121 See Section 8.3.3 above.
 122 Copyright Act, ss 3, 13(4).
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of the art would have the right to maintain or repair the work, and likely the right to dispose of 
(destroy) the work as previously discussed in this chapter.124 The property owner may also benefit 
from user rights or exceptions to the exclusive copyright of the artist, which I will address next.
8.4.2 Exceptions to Copyright Infringement or “User Rights”
Exceptions to copyright infringement allow users or the public to perform acts on a work (e.g. graf-
fiti or mural art) normally reserved to their author (e.g. the exclusive right to reproduce the work) 
without having to ask permission or grant remuneration to the street artist. Users freely performing 
such acts still need to respect the moral rights of the artist as these exceptions only apply to copy-
right, not to the artist’s moral rights.125
The rights that property owners or the public may have to graffiti or street art raises particu-
larly interesting questions in Canada given jurisprudential and legislative developments of the 
last decades affirming the place of users in copyright law. In the landmark judgment CCH,126 the 
Supreme Court of Canada interpreted the fair dealing and other exceptions to copyright infringe-
ment as integral to the Copyright Act.127 The Court qualified exceptions as “users’ rights” that 
required a broad interpretation.128
Through CCH and subsequent judgments by the Supreme Court,129 “user rights” has become a 
rule of interpretation that gives increased prominence to the role of exceptions in balancing com-
peting interests in copyright law.130 In addition to stating that the allowed purposes under the fair 
dealing provisions called for a “large and liberal interpretation,”131 the Supreme Court held that the 
purpose of “research” included research for commercial purposes,132 and that “private research” could 
be conducted in a classroom in the presence of others.133 Treating exceptions as users’ rights also led 
the Supreme Court to interpret exceptions from the perspective of the user, not copyright holders.134
Further, the Copyright Act was significantly amended in 2012, introducing new exceptions to 
copyright infringement (or user rights), some of which are of particular interest to the rights the 
public may have to graffiti or street art.135 It is in the light of these jurisprudential and legislative 
developments that I will look at the various exceptions to copyright infringement or user rights that 
may apply to property owners or the public in relation to graffiti or street art.
8.4.2.1 Right of Panorama
The Copyright Act provides a limited “right of panorama,” i.e., the right to reproduce sculptures 
or works of artistic craftsmanship situated permanently in a public place or building in another 
form (i.e., a painting, drawing, engraving, photograph, or cinematographic work).136 The right of 
 124 See Section 8.3.2.
 125 Copyright Act, ss 29ff; see however Wiseau (n 57).
 126 CCH (n 7).
 127 Ibid. at para 48, citing David Vaver.
 128 Ibid.
 129 Ibid.; Bell Canada (n 1); Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 SCC 
37 [Alberta]; CRTC (n 3).
 130 CCH (n 7), para 48; Bell Canada (n 1) paras 9– 11, 49; see Chapdelaine (n 51), 48– 49.
 131 CCH (n 7), para 51; Bell Canada (n 1) para 15; Alberta (n 129), para 19.
 132 CCH (n 7), para 51.
 133 Alberta (n 129), paras 19, 27.
 134 Ibid. para 22; Bell Canada (n 1), paras 29, 30, 34.
 135 Copyright Modernization Act (n 9); see discussion on the non- commercial user- generated content user 
immediately below.
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panorama applies to specific types of artistic work only. Although not defined in the Copyright 
Act, “works of artistic craftsmanship” suggests an art form that is distinct from paintings and 
drawings.137 The mechanics of the right of panorama suggest that it applies only to tri- dimensional 
works, allowing their reproduction into bi- dimensional derivative works only. That could be an 
explanation for the exclusion of painting and drawings as two- dimensional works from the right 
of panorama.138
What the right of panorama entitles members of the public to do is unclear and there is little 
case law on this provision and its predecessors. Some authors are of the view that it is limited to 
a reproduction right of, say, the sculpture or work of artistic craftsmanship in a photograph or 
cinematographic work that does not extend to the right to publish such film or photograph.139 
The 1921 Act140 included a similar provision that explicitly extended to the right to publish such 
photographs (or other derivative works) embedding the sculpture or work of artistic crafts-
manship in a public space, unlike the current Act.141 As one of the objectives of the right of 
panorama is to address the practical reality of the public interacting with works of art in public 
spaces, a right that is limited to two forms of artistic works fails in an important way to address 
this practical reality by not including paintings and drawings, an increasingly prevailing form 
of street art. This represents a narrow view of the forms of art that are expected to appear in 
public spaces.142
Further, a right of panorama that is strictly limited to reproduction in one of the listed 
material forms would fail to address the evolution of the public’s interaction with artistic 
works in public spaces through new technologies and prevailing social norms. For instance, 
a right of panorama strictly limited to the reproduction in one of the listed material forms 
would not allow widespread practices of people documenting online their daily lives, sharing 
photos and videos of their travels on social media and YouTube, etc. by not allowing the 
reproduction of the work to be communicated to the public by telecommunication. As we 
will see next, the communication to the public of the photograph or video as well as other 
acts reserved to copyright holders may be allowed under the non- commercial user- generated 
content exception to copyright infringement, provided that the photograph or video would 
qualify as a new original work (as opposed to a purely mechanical exercise lacking neces-
sary skill or judgment) and would be for non- commercial purposes and fulfill the other 
requirements of that exception.143
While one would think the right of panorama and its explicit reference to works situated in 
public spaces would be most relevant and directly applicable to graffiti and street art, a closer 
look reveals a narrow scope that is of little avail to members of the public interacting with 
 137 Ibid. s 2:  “artistic work includes paintings, drawings, … sculptures, works of artistic craftsmanship, architectural 
works, and compilations of artistic works”. The enumeration of works under that definition suggests that “works of 
artistic craftsmanship” is something distinct from a painting or a drawing. See Iljadica (n 110), at 263 on the interpret-
ation of a similar provision in the UK: Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, c.48, s. 62 [UKCDPA].
 138 See Iljadica (n 110) at 264, suggesting that the exclusion of graphic works from UKCDPA, s.62 would be a deliberate 
limitation on the application of the exception, by not allowing a reproduction of the art in public spaces in a similar 
form (e.g. does not allow the reproduction of a sculpture in another sculpture).
 139 Tamaro (n 84) 724.
 140 An Act to amend and consolidate the Law relating to Copyright, SC 1921, c. 24, considered the first comprehensive 
act dealing with copyright in Canada.
 141 Ibid. s 16(1)(iii), allowed “the making or publishing of paintings, drawings, engravings, or photographs of a work of 
sculpture or artistic craftsmanship.”
 142 Iljadica (n 110) 263.
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various art forms in public spaces. The public needs to look elsewhere to compensate for the 
shortcomings of this limited exception to copyright infringement.
8.4.2.2 Non- Commercial User- Generated Content
Introduced in 2012 and coined the “YouTube exception,” the non- commercial user- generated 
content exception to copyright infringement [UGC exception]144 allows the use of a published 
work (or otherwise made available) in the creation of a new original work, and to perform any of 
the reserved acts with respect to this new original work provided that any such acts are for non- 
commercial purposes, and that such use “does not have a substantial adverse effect, financial or 
otherwise, on the exploitation or potential exploitation of the existing work.”145 The UGC excep-
tion takes an innovative approach that has been praised and criticized, consonant with evolving 
technological environments and social norms, that gives more room to the powers and privileges 
users should have with respect to published works (or otherwise made available to the public).146
While there is no case law on the interpretation of the UGC exception to copyright infringe-
ment at the time of completion of this chapter, this user right would allow a passerby to take a 
photo or shoot a video in front of a street mural and post it on their favourite social media, provided 
that the photo or video qualifies as a distinct original work from the street mural, and that it would 
be used or disseminated solely for non- commercial purposes (and if the source of the street mural 
is mentioned, if reasonable in the circumstances to do so).147 The requirement that the under-
lying work has been published “or otherwise made available” would grant enough flexibility for 
this user right to apply to a broad range of situations involving graffiti or street art: the requirement 
of publication would be met to the extent that the graffiti or street art is incorporated into an 
architectural work,148 and depending on the interpretation of “otherwise made available,” would 
cover other instances where falling short of a publication under the Copyright Act, the work is 
publicly accessible with the authorization of the artist.149 By giving room to the public to interact, 
comment, incorporate, and communicate images of graffiti and street art on various media (so 
long as such use is not for commercial purposes) the user- generated- content right facilitates a 
dialogue between artists and the public that is at the heart of graffiti and street art’s purpose, and 
should satisfy artists’ rights and interests. As with all other user rights, the user- generated- content 
exception does not extend to moral rights which continue to apply.
8.4.2.3 Fair Dealing and Other Exceptions to Copyright Infringement
In addition to the right of panorama and the user- generated- content exceptions to copyright 
infringement, the public may benefit from other relevant exceptions to copyright infringement. 
Without doing an exhaustive review of those exceptions, members of the public could, for 
example, where applicable and based on their interaction with graffiti or street art, invoke fair 
dealing, rights of educational institutions, and the right to incidental inclusion.
 144 Copyright Act, s 29.21.
 145 Ibid.
 146 On the UGC exception to copyright infringement, see Peter K. Yu, “Can the Canadian UGC Exception Be 
Transplanted Abroad?” (2014) 26 I.P.J. 175; Rebecca Katz, “Fan Fiction and Canadian Copyright Law: Defending 
Fan Narratives in the Wake of Canada’s Copyright Reforms” (2014) 12 Can. J.  L. & Tech. 73. For a critique of 
the UGC exception to copyright infringement, arguing that it is too broad, see:  Marian Hebb, “UGC and Fan 
Fiction: Rethinking Section 29.21” (2014) 26 I.P.J. 237.
 147 Copyright Act, s 29.21.
 148 Ibid. s. 2.2(1)(a)(iii).
 149 E.g., the exhibition of a work in public does not amount to publication under the Act: ibid. s. 2.2(1)(d), but may be 
















Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Cambridge University Press, on 04 Feb 2021 at 17:22:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Graffiti, Street Art, Walls, and Public: Canada 141
141
Like other jurisdictions of the English copyright tradition, the fair dealing provisions allow 
users to perform acts with respect to a copyright work if such acts are made for one of their 
enumerated purposes and if the dealing is fair.150 In Canada, fair dealing may be invoked for 
the purpose of research, private study, criticism, review, news reporting, and the more recently 
introduced purposes of education, parody, or satire.151 As stated in the leading case CCH, fair 
dealing provisions need to be interpreted largely and liberally.152 The Supreme Court has 
also confirmed that the enumerated purposes could fall within a commercial activity.153 The 
assessment of the fairness of the dealing is subject to a non- exhaustive list of six factors,154 among 
which the effect of the dealing on the work (e.g. on the market of the author or copyright holder) 
may be considered along with the relevant other factors, without being given more prominence 
than the others.155 Filming graffiti and murals for the purpose of a documentary on the evolution 
of street art in Canadian cities could be a fair dealing for the purpose of criticism, review, or news 
reporting, provided it complied with the source referencing requirements.156 Fair dealing for the 
purpose of criticism or review may possibly be invoked for an illustrated book analyzing various 
genres of graffiti as well as graffiti communities in Montréal.157 Photos of murals taken for an art 
project could fall under the purpose of research or private study,158 and when taken by a school-
teacher for her students, under the educational purpose.159 In all of these scenarios, the graffiti 
or street art would be reproduced in another material form with various purposes linked to the 
dissemination of education, knowledge, and culture, and would align well with the objectives of 
copyright to balance the interests of the author with those of the public.160
A work, e.g. a filmed advertisement that would incidentally and not deliberately include 
graffiti or other street art in one of its scenes or background, or around which any reserved act 
would be performed would be allowed to the extent that it falls under the incidental inclusion 
exception to copyright infringement.161
As with other user rights, all exceptions to copyright infringement mentioned above do not 
extend to moral rights, which continue to apply. In addition, user rights may overlap and the 
same person may invoke more than one exception such as fair dealing and exceptions applying 
to educational institutions162 or to persons with perceptual disabilities.163
8.4.2.4 Implied License
Could an author’s deliberate choice to display their work in free and open spaces accessible 
to all, as is the case with graffiti and street art, call for the application of an implied license to 
the members of the public to perform certain acts with the art piece that would be otherwise 
reserved to copyright holders? Implied licenses or some sort of abandonment of rights are in 
 150 Ibid. ss 29– 29.2.
 151 Ibid.
 152 CCH (n 7), paras 48, 51.
 153 Ibid. para 51.
 154 Ibid. paras 53– 60. The factors are: (1) the purpose of the dealing; (2) the character of the dealing; (3) the amount of 
the dealing; (4) alternatives to the dealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of the dealing on the work.
 155 Ibid. para 59.
 156 Copyright Act, ss 29.1– 29.2.
 157 Ibid. s 29.1.
 158 Ibid. s. 29.
 159 Ibid. ss 29; 29.4– 30.04 (exceptions applicable to educational institutions).
 160 See Section 8.1.
 161 Copyright Act, s 30.7.
 162 Ibid. ss 29.4– 30.04.
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some ways similar in effect to a waiver of moral rights discussed earlier.164 In Canada, the doc-
trine of implied license has been typically successfully invoked by users who have a contract 
with a copyright holder (e.g. architect, software developer, or musical composer). In those cases, 
courts have implied a license under the contract allowing the user of the copyright work to 
perform certain acts (such as to make modifications to the work) that were not in the contract 
and are restricted by the Copyright Act, to bring efficacy to the transaction by recognizing what 
the user had in fact contracted for.165 While a license may be implied in some cases between a 
street artist and the person who commissioned a mural (and owns the physical embodiment), 
the current body of case law of implied license would be of little use to members of the public 
who interact with street art, but have no contractual relationship with the author of the art piece.
Outside the contractual sphere, it is unclear whether by their conduct, graffiti or street artists 
could be deemed to have granted an authorization to the public or to have (partially) abandoned 
their rights.
Courts are reluctant to imply by an author’s conduct that an authorization was granted in 
favor of users or that some sort of abandonment to the public took place.166 Unlike other forms 
of intellectual property167 authors and copyright holders are generally free to not use or enforce 
their rights without impacting the existence or scope of their exclusive rights. To read in an 
implicit relinquishment of some sort through authors’ (in)actions would depart from that gen-
eral principle.
In the earlier judgment International Press Ltd. v Tunnell,168 the Ontario Court of Appeal 
rejected the argument that a third party was authorized to reproduce and publish a work that 
had been left out of print for a number of years.169
Commentators have argued that the property doctrine of abandonment should apply 
to copyright in limited circumstances, so long as the artist or copyright holder expli-
citly intended such abandonment or that such intent can be inferred by their conduct and 
surrounding circumstances.170 If courts were to recognize that by their conduct and surrounding 
circumstances, graffiti and street artists abandoned their right (in whole or in part) for the benefit 
of the public to perform certain acts with their art, what would be the parameters to assess such 
intent and what would be the scope of such relinquishment? How much weight should be 
given to the purposeful availability of the artistic work in public spaces? How is this different 
from other published works? Should any weight be given to an artistic work produced illegally 
without the authorization of the property owner? Would relinquishment of control of the phys-
ical embodiment of the work also indicate an intent of some (limited) form of abandonment in 
the underlying copyright work? Would it allow members of the public to use the street art for 
commercial purposes? I have made a normative argument elsewhere that in such cases of works 
 164 See Section 8.3.2.
 165 See e.g. Tremblay v Orio Canada Inc., 2013 FCA 225, para 25, citing Netupsky v Dominion Bridge, [1972] S.C.R. 
368; Pinto v Bronfman Jewish Education Centre, 2013 FC 945; Crochetière- Brousseau c. 9107- 0235 Québec Inc., 2015 
FC 1219.
 166 McKeown (n 98)  at para 16:11 pointing to the question of implied license or abandonment to the public as a 
contentious issue.
 167 Trade- Marks Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. T- 13), s 45(3) allows for expungement of a trademark from the registry upon evi-
dence that it was not used in the last three years preceding relevant notice by the Registrar.
 168 1937 CarswellOnt 303, [1938] 1 D.L.R. 393(Ont. Ct. Appeal)
 169 Ibid.: “it is clear that a proprietor of a copyright does not lose his right of publication by permitting his book to remain 
out of print and obsolete for any number of years.”
 170 Emily Hudson and Robert Burrell, “Abandonment, Copyright and Orphaned Works: What Does it Mean to Take 
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made available by the author in public spaces as in the case of public street art, there should be 
a rebuttable presumption of an implied license (or partial abandonment) allowing the use of 
the work in any manner that does not conflict with the commercial exploitation of the copyright 
work and that does not infringe the moral rights of the author.171 Thus while a photo of graffiti 
art to be shared on social media for non- commercial purposes could fall under such presumed 
implied license (or partial abandonment), the reproduction of graffiti on T- shirts or prints for 
sale may not as that potentially interferes with the commercial exploitation of the work and 
moral rights of the author.
8.5 Conclusion
While the scope of copyright protection of graffiti and street art may be, on the whole, fairly 
easily ascertainable and may offer a desirable level of protection to their authors, the rights of 
the public with respect to graffiti and street art remain fragmented, somewhat unclear, and likely 
too limited. This finding gives a sobering account of the extent to which Canadian copyright law 
succeeds in adequately addressing competing interests, such as where allowances for commu-
nication and access between the graffiti or street artist, their work of art, and the public should 
be at their highest.
Many questions are left unexplored in this chapter. Among those, the social movement 
and specific issues related to the legal protection of graffiti and street art made by Canada’s 
Indigenous artists.172 The insights that ethnographic, anthropological, and other studies of graffiti 
artist communities may bring to the regulation of street art have not been brought into the pre-
sent analysis.173 Last but not least, reassessing the very purpose and effects of the criminalization 
of graffiti and street art for graffiti artists, private owners, and the public interest has been left for 
another day.
 171 Chapdelaine (n 51), 201– 02.
 172 E.g., issues surrounding the protection of traditional cultural expressions, including the sacredeness of certain 
symbols and art forms.
 173 A sample of recent works includes: George J. Snyder, Graffiti Lives: Beyond the Tag in New York’s Urban Underground 
(New York University Press 2009); Brighenti (n 78); Ricardo Campos, “Youth, Graffiti, and the Aestheticization of 
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